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A director of a corporation may become its creditor, and take and enforce a mortgage on its property, but le is not thereby divested of his responsibility as a director,
Ror the duties which as such he owes to the corporation, and lie is bound to act in
the utmost good faith throughout the transaction.
Facts considered upon which it was held that a sale of property of a corporation,
under a mortgage held by one of its directors, should be set aside.

APPEAL from Warren District Court.
The defendant E. W. Perry, and the defendant J. E. Lucas,
each obtained a decree of foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
against the defendant, the Indianola Hotel Co., a corporation duly
incorporated under the laws of Iowa. An execution sale was
made thereon, and the property was putchased by Perry for the
amount of both decrees an interest and costs, and the property
is now held by him for himself and Lucas. The plaintiff Hallam
is a stockholder in the hotel company, and he brings this action to
set aside the sale, and the decrees, and the mortgages upon which
the decrees were rendered. The alleged ground of the action is
that the mortgages were invalid, and that the decrees were obtained
by fraud, and that the purchase by Perry at- the foreclosure sale
should be set aside because Perry is one of the directors of the
company. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition and he
appeals.
Cole &5Cole and Hf. HeN'eil, for appellant.
Todlhuvter J- H7artman, H7enderson & Berry and Seevers &
Sampson, for appellees.
ADAMS, C. J.-One of the mortgages is exceedingly informal,
and neither appears to have been executed by the authority of the
board of directors of the defendant company. If, therefore, the
foreclosure of the mortgages had been resisted by the company. it
seems doubtful to us whether the decrees thereon could properly
have been obtained. But having been obtained, they constitute
an adjudication, and are binding upon the company unless they
wore obtained by fraud. It appears to us also that if the com-
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pany is bound by them, all the stockholders are bound by them,
i,,cluding the plaintiff. His interest in the litigation was represented by the company, and he was not only not a necessary party,
but.not a proper party.
Coming to the question as to whether there was any fraud
practised in obtaining the decrees, we have to say that we think
that there was not. The amount for which the decrees were rendered was due from the company, and had become payable. The
complaint seems to be that these creditors combined with the officers of the company and were allowed to take decrees of foreclosure, whereas they should have granted an extension, or the
company should have borrowed money and paid them off. The
objection is not to the mode of foreclosure, so far as obtaining the
decrees is concerned, but to the fact of foreclosure. But it is not
for us to say that the creditors should have granted an extension,
or that the company shotild have borrowed money and paid them
and thereby prevented a foreclosure. If we should conclude that
the affairs of the company were very unwisely managed, and tht
the foreclosures might have been prevented, such conclusion would
fall short of justifying us in holding that the decrees were obtained
by fraud.
Nor do we think that the fact that Perry was a director of the
company necessarily precluded him from making a valid purchase
at the foreclosure sale. His right to become a creditor of the company by loaning it money cannot be questioned for a moment. It
was equally his right to take security and enforce it, and it seems
to follow, that he should be allowed for his just protection to bid
at an execution sale of the property upon which he was secured.
That a director of a corporation may bid at an execution sale made
to pay a debt due the director from the corporation was expressly
held in Twin Lick Oil 0o. v. . Morbury, 91 U. S. 587.
While this is so, it is not to be denied that a fiduciary relation
exists, and a director cannot wholly divest himself of his responsibility to the company even in the very mattei in which he has
become an adversary. In Twin Lick Oil Go. v. Morbury, above
cited, the court said "that a director of a joint stock corporation
susfains one of those fiduciary relations where his dealings with
the subject-matter of his trust or agency, and with the beneficiary
or party whose interest is confided to his care, are viewed with
jealousy by the courts and may be set aside on slight grounds, and
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isa doctrine founded on the soundest morality, and has received
Citing
the clearest recognition in this court and in others."
Kochler v. Black River Falls Iron 0o., 2 Black 715; Drury v.
Cross, 7 Wall. 299; Luxemburg Railroad Co. v. loguayj, 25
Beav. 586; The Cusmberland Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553.
While, therefore, it was held that the creditor director was at
liberty to bid at the execution sale, yet it was said that the liberty
should be exercised subject to the rules which belong to his peculiar position. Under the doctrine enunciated, we are called upon
to look into the acts of Perry with far greater scrutiny than we
should be if he sustained no relation to the company other than
that of creditor, and would be justified, we think, in setting aside
the sale upon much slighter ground.
The defendant company was incorporated for the.purpose of
building a hotel. The indebtedness in question was incurred as a
part of its cost. But it was a comparatively small part, amounting
at the time of sale to but little more than $4000, and in that sum
was included considerable accrued interest. .The cost of the hotel
,appears to have been about $1U,000. By the execution sale in
question, the whole property has been exhausted to pay the corn
paratively small balance of cost of construction. The enterprise
has certainly come to a very remarkable result.
Again, the evidence shows that the hotel was at the time of the
execution sale rented at $900 a year. It also shows, we think,
that it was worth not less than $10,000. That it was allowed to
be sold upon execution and was not redeemed, nor the right of
redemption sold, but a sheriff's deed allowed to issue, while not
sufficient to establish .fraud, is sufficient to excite sus'icion and
give some support to the claim strenuously insisted upon by the
plaintiff, and of which we think there was some slight evidence at
least, that there was a concert of action between Perry and the other
officers of -the company looking to the attainment of the result
which has been reached. Now Perry was charged with the duty,
as much as any other director was. of making a reasonable efibrt
to prevent this result. It follows that, our minds being affected
with suspicion that such effort was not made, we cannot say that the
sale to Perry ought to be allowed to stand. We ihink that the sale
should be set aside and the case remanded; that an account should
be taken of the rents and profits received by Perry and Lucas, if
any ; that the judgment in their fai;or should be reduced by what-
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ever amounts they are properly chargeable with', less proper expenditures, and an execution issue for the balance and the property
resold.
Reversed.
A director may sell his corporation
goods on credit. He may lend it money,
endorse its paper, or in -,ny manner become surety for it. "1We have never
heard it questioned," SIays WALKEr,
C. J., speaking for the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in Htarts v. .Brown, infia,
"that a director or stockholder may
trade with, borrow from or loan money
to the company of which he is a mem'ber."
The question is, When directors
of a corporation have become its creditors, what are their rights and duties ?
At least one of the authorities in point
upon this question is an instance of railway "wrecking."
A review of the
cases will be interesting. *
Four directors of a railway company
endorsed its notes to B. & Co. for
$21,000, secured by $42,000, in mortgage bonds of the road. The company
became insolvent. B. & Co. were unwilling to trust to the mortgage and bonds
fbr security and sued the four directors
on their endorsements. They in turn
entered upon the foreclosure of the
mortgage, basing their foreclosure upon
the $42,000 and certain other bonds of
the road held by the city of Milwaukee.
A decree of foreclosurc was rendered
and a master ordered to take an
account.
Just prior to this the four directors
sought for some one who would purchase
B. & Co.'s claims and rely entirely upon
the mortgage for payment. They found
C. & Co., with whom they made this
arrangement: There were deposited with
J. & Co. $280,000 in bonds similar to
the $42,000 already mentioned. These
bonds had never been, and were not to
he, issued until B. & Co.'s debt was
paid amd twenty-seven miles of road
built. In fact but five miles were built.

It was arranged to deliver this $280,000
in bonds to B. & Co., and the four directors, constituting a quorum of the board,
passed a resolution so to deliver them.
Then B. & Co. were to deliver their
notes and the judgments thereon, together with the $42,000 and $280,000in all $322,000-collateral bonds to C.
& Co. They did so, C. & Co. paying
B. & Co. $13,330.20 for them. c: &
Co., in order as they said to become absolute owners of them, then
sold the $322,000 in bonds on the lilwaukee Exchange and became themselves the purchasers for a small sum.
Then they appeared before the master
as creditors of the road upon $322,000
in its bonds. He allowed these 1 omds
as a lien upon the road, and 'upon them
and no others was a final decree of sale
rendered in the foreclosure suit. Tie
entire railroad, its franchises, rolling
stock (two locomotives and tenders, and
with ten platform cars) and fixtures,
in all worth nearly $75,000, were then
The
sold to C. & Co. for $20,100.
other creditors were left unpaid, and
D. & Co., to whom over $20,000 were
due for locomotives, filed a bill to reach
the property in the hands of C. & Co.
The court set aside the sale as fraudulent, and decreed an accounting by C.
& Co.
Said Mr. Justice DAvis : "We do
not deny that a debtor has a legal right
to prefer one creditor over another when
the transaction is bona fide; but this is
in no just sense a case of preference between creditors. If the law permits the
debtor in failing circumstances to make
a choice of the persons he will pay, it
denies him the right in doing it to contrive that the -unpreferred creditor shall
never be paid. In other words, the law
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-condemns any plan in the disposition of
property which necessarily accomplishes
a fraudulent result."
B. & Co., preferring not to enforce
til mortgage lien, only consented .that
it should be done. on their being inThe court
demnified against costs.
admitted that the directors had an undoubted right to indemnify B. & Co.
It was admitted also that if B. & Co.
insisted upon suing the directors personally they had as undoubted a right to
secure some one who would purchase B.
& Co.'s claims and collect them by foreclosure of the mortgage. "But," says
Mfr. Justice DAvis, "their (the directors) departure from right conduct commenced at this point. Notwithstanding
they had control of the foreclosure-suit,
they were not content to let it proceed to
decree and sale without they were in
advance relieved of personal responsibility ;" and in order to induce C. &

creditor," say the court, " and was not
to be favored, it is barely possible that
the directors thought his presence wouldbe embarrassing."
One of the direc-

tors was appointed secretarypro teinpore.
The company's note and mortgage was
then given to K. and B. for $15,000, in
consideration of which they were to advance the company $1200 in money, let
it have $800 worth of provisions, and
pay the debts owing from the company
to the directors constituting the meeting.
Subsequently a large interest in the
mortgage was assigned to two of those
*directors, and they filed a bill to foreclose. The stockholders resisted, and
the mortgage was declared fraudulent
and void: Kodder v. Black 1R. F. .
Co., 2 Black 715.
In Coons v. Tone, 9 Fed. Rep. 532,
the board of directors of an insolvent
corporation confessed a judgment against
the corporation in favor of one of their
number, who was also the president of
Co.'so to relieve them, they swelled the
the corporation and principal stockindebtedness of the company beyond its
holder, with a view of giving him priortrue amount by issuing without authority
ity of lien over another creditor, who
$280,000 bonds and became participants
was about to obtain a judgment in a
and tools in a collusive and fraudulent
It was decided
judicial proceeding.
sale and sacrifice of the whole of the
that such a preference could not be upAs to creditors
company's property.
held, but that the two judgments must
and stockholders, it was the duty of the
stand on a footing of.equality in respect
directors to keep down the indebtedness
to the commencement of the lien, and
of the company and preserve its assets,
share pro rate in the proceeds of the proso that the former might be paid their
perty available for their payment. The
just dues, and the latter protected from
court said: "The directors of a corpopersonal liability for demands possibly
ration stand in confidential relation to
payable, by honest management, out of
its creditors, towards whom they are
They very
the company's property.
bound to act with perfect fairness. They
clearly violated their fiduciary duties,
are, at least, quasi trustees for the credand their conduct was thoroughly selitors ; and where the corporation is infish, illegal and discreditable : Drury v.
solvent, good faith forbids that the
Cross, 7 Wall. 302.
directors should use their position to save
In another case the' stockholders inthemselves, or one of their number, at
structed the directors to effect as large a
the expense of other creditors."
loan as they could for the company, and
In Bednett's Case, 18 Beav. 339, A.,
to secure it by mortgage on its lands
and works. Certain of the directors,
a creditor of a mining company, was
who were also creditors, called a meetthe father of two of its directors, B.
irig,
omitting to notiCy the regular seeand C., one of whom was also a
creditor of the company. The consent
ictary to attend. " As he was a large
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of the directors was a necessary prerequisite to any transfer of the company's stock by the holders. It was
embarrassed and some of the shareholders were dissatisfied, and desired to
sell their shares, but B. and C., having
control of the board of directors, refused
to permit them to transfer their stock,
unless a sum of money, Jargely in excess of calls due from them and unpaid,
was advanced by the dissatisfied shareholders to be applied tipan the claims
of the director, B., and his father, A.
The money was paid and so applied, A.
and B. releasing the retiring sharehold-"
ers from: all liability in rcspect of their
claims. It was admitted that if this
money had been paid in good faith, in a
manner most for the benefit of the company, the transaction could be sustained.
But the court decided that the essence of
the transaction being tat a benefit
should be obtained by a director and
his family, and it being manifest that
the transaction itself could not have
taken place without the directors' sanction, it could not stand; and the retiring shareholders, oii the company being
wound up, were placed in the list of
contributories..
In New Hampshire a court of equity
decided that the directors of an insurance company could not legally apply its
funds to the payment of losses for which
they were individually responsible in
preference to others : Ricliardsv. N. .
Ins. Co., 43 N. H. 263.
v. Ludeling, 21 Wall.
In .'ackson
616, the Vicksburg, Shreveport and
Texas Railroad Company owned property worth more than two millions.
It owed about three-quarters of a million in mortgage bonds, oi which, being
embarrassed, it was unable to meet the
accrued interest. Pursuant to resolutions of the stockholders thet directors
appointed tie president to arrange to
sell the road to any other company who
could put it inrepair, complete it " and
pay the- debts of the company." One

Gordon conceived a scheme of forcing
a sale under the mortgage, there being,
as lie represented, "a probability of a
very decided speculation from the sale."
He purchased for $640 four of the
company's $1000 rportgage bonds, on
which $720 interest was due and unWithout notice to any other
paid.
bondholders he applied to a court and
obtained an exparte order for a sale of
the road under the mortgage. Then
Ludeling and several of the directors,
who had combined to buy out the company, associated with Gordon. Meanwhile other bondholders met and commissioned one Home to go to Monroe,
where the Gordon party were operating,
to have the road sold, and purchased by
trustees to be selected by the bondholders and other creditors of the company.
They further proposed a plan to adjust
the indebtedness of the old company
and to organize a new one. At New
Orleans Horne met Gordon, and for the
first time learned of the proceedings to
sell the road. He went to Monroe and
sought to postpone the sale, but failed,
and was pursuaded "for himself and his
friends" to become one of the Gordon
party. That combination appointed appraisers, who, valued the property at
$75,000. It was then put up for sale,
the sheriff imposing this condition upon
purchasers: That whoever purchased
should then and there cash ainy interest
coupons due and unpaid which might be
presented. The first bid was Branner
& Co.'s, who offered $550,000 for the
property. " Then ensued," says Air.
Justice STItONG, "' what we must regard as a most remarkable effort to prevent an adjudication to these bidders
indan acceptance by the sheriff of their
bid. Ludeling, for himself and his associates, and acting as their chief agent,
presented one hundred and fifty-four of
the mortgage bonds, four of which were
Gordon's, one Bry's (an officer of the
road) and most, if not all, the remain.
der obtained from Horne, and demanded
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Immediate payment of the past due coupons. He had no right to make such a
demand. He knew the bonds had been
placed in Horne's hand for other purposes. He knew that it was a breach
of faith in Horme to allow them to be

thus used, and a fraud upon their owners thus to use them. Stubbs (an associate of Ludcling and Gordon) presented
seventy-two coupons taken from other
bonds, and also demanded immediate
payment. And liehad no authority to
make such use of those coupons. They
had been placed in hishands for another
purpose, which failed, and their owners
had directed them to be returned. Bry
also had one bond, and he presented it
with its coupons. This one bond, with
the four of Gordon, were all that there
was any authority to present. Yet
'the confederates, taking advantage of
Home's breach of trust, and of Stubbs's
unauthorized act, were enabled to present the coupons of one hundred and
fifty-four bonds and part of the coupons
of thirty-six other bonds for immediate
payment. The sheriff joined in the demand, and, because Branner & Co. were
unable at once to pay this unauthorized
claim, lie set up the property again immediately for sale, when it was struck
off on Ludeling's bid of $50,000 to the
persons we have named (the confederacy). This was oniSaturday, late in
the afternoon, and on Monday next following the sheriff's deed was delivered,
but the bidders, though receipting in
part to each other, have still in their
hands the whole of their bid except
$468.75, the amount of costs paid to
the sheriff."
Upon these facts the court, at the suit
of six hundred and sixty of the bondholders, set aside the sale, declared the
mortgage still a lien, appointed a receiver, and decr ed other necessary
relief.
Commenting upon such of tle
dirotors as were associates of Gordlon,
along whonewere some that were bondholding screditors, the court, by YMr.
VOL. XXX.-57

had
STRONG, says:" "They
no right to join hands with Gordon.
They had no right to enter into or participate in a combination, the object of
which was to divest the company of its
property and obtain it for themselves at
a sacrifice, or at the lowest price possible.
They had no right to seek their own
profit at the expense of the company,
its stockholders, or even its bondholders.
Such a course was forbidden by their
It was
relation to the company.
their duty to the extent of their
power, to secure for all those whose
interests were in their charge the highest possible price for the property which
could be obtained for it at the sheriff's
sale. They could not rightfully place
themselves in a position in which their
interests became adverse to those of
either the stockholders or bondholdcrs."
This case has been alluded to as an
'
Such
instance of railway "wrecking."
instances are not uncommon. Equity
will, at the suit of any, however small,
minority of defrauded stock or bondholders, set aside such transactions:
Menier v. Hooper Telegraph Works,
L. R., 9 Ch. 350 ; Salomons v: Lang,
12 Beav. 339 ; Gregory v. Fatchett, 33
Id. 595; In re Bank of Gibraltar,
L. R., 1 Ch. 68 ;,Robinson v. Smith, 3
Paige 222 ; Percy v. Alillaudon, 8 Mart.
N. S. 68; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen
52 ; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331;
Brown v. Vandyke, 8 X. J. Eq. 795;
Kennebec, 4c., Railroad Co. v. Portland,
6-c., Railroad Co., 54 Me. 173; Cohi
quilt v. Howard, 11 Ga. 556 ; Forbes v.
Whitock, 3 Edw. Oh. 446 ; Greaves v.
Gouge, 69 N. Y. 154; Butts v. Mood,
37 Id. 317 ; Hazard v. Durant, 11 R.
I. 195.
In ,fxparte Larking, L. R., 4 Ch.
Div. 566, Larking had been a director.
His company became bankrupt, and
with knowledge of this lieresigned.
Subsequently he purchased 20001. in its
depreciated debentures, paying theretbor
567/. Then lie appeared in bankruptcy,
Justice
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and as a creditor sought to prove up
these debentures against the company as
a debt of 20001. and interest thereon.
The claim was disallowed, except for
the sum [5671.] actually paid. MALINS, V.
C., saying: "* * * 'No
trustee, who buys tip an encumbrance
upon an estate of which he is trustee, can
ever against the trust estate make a
profit, and never can recover against
the cestui que trust more than the price
he gave for it. If a man, who is a trustee of an estate, buys up a mortgage
upon it at 20 per cent., he can only get
the 20 per cent. with interest upon
what he paid. Here is a man', a director of a company, who is a trustee.
He has all the obligations of a trustee
to perform. Here is a case in which
he knows the company is insolvent
at the time-that it had actually came
to a disastrous end when he bought
these debentures, and on that principle
alone he cannot make a profit by his
trusteeship."
See, also, C. C. 6- A. Co.
v. Parish,42 31d. 598.
As to what directors who are creditors
may do to secure payment of their dues,
the case'of Smith v. Lansbg, 22 N. Y.
520, is interesting. To secure certain
deposits a bank gave bonds, Lansing,
its president, becoming, with others,
sureties thereon. Lansing was the general managing agent and financial
officer of the bank. It had no board of
directors.
"lie occupied, therefore,
the place, and possessed all the powers,
of * * * directors *

*

*

.

It

is

proper, therefore, to consider the questions presented in the same light as if
there had been a regular board of directors, and the acts done by the defendant [Lansingl, had been done in pursuance of resolutions of * * * directors
* **
.
[Per WELLES, J.] Subse-

quently certain property was sold to
pay claims due the bank on mortgages.
Lansing purchased this property, paying
for it with funds of the bank, but taking
the title in his own name. At this time

the bank was entirely solvent. Later it
became insolvent, and a receiver was
appointed who sought to compel Lansing to convey the property to him for
the benefit of creditors. Lansing, in
defence, claimed to hold the property as
security for the money he and his cosureties bad paid for the bank, or were
liable to pay for it, on the deposit
bonds, and it was decided that he could
hold the lands as such security. Considerable stress was laid by the court
upon the good faith of the transactions
and the solvency of the bank at the time
they took place. These were admitted,
and the case appears to have been considered analogous to that of a debtor who,
while solvent, and with more assets
than indebtedness, transfers a portion
of his surplus property to his friends,.
family or creditors.
Another interesting case is that of
Harts v. Brown, 77 Ill. 226. The Lincoln Coal Company contracted debts to
nearly $33,000, and also issued bonds
to one Musick, who appears to have
been a director, for $9400, executing a
trust-deed of its property to him to
secure them. The company became
involved, its property was sold under
a mechanic's lien for $2000, its bonds
matured, payment thereof was demanded,
and an extension refused unless personal security was given. A stockholders' meeting was called, and
measures were taken by, among others,
the directors, to form a new company,
the proposers thereof agreeing to purchase from Musick his stock, bonds and
claims against the company, and to pay
him therefor with their notes secured by
mortgage on their interest in the coal
company's property. He agreed to
make a sale under the trust-deed for
their benefit. This sale was made, bne
Frorer becoming purchaser, paying the
amount of the indebtedness of the company, and buying for the use of all
stockholders who should join in the new
company, the proposers of which also

HALLAM v. RMDIANOLA HOTEL Co.
purchased the certificate of sale under
the mechnic's lien. The new company was then organized, and the property thus purchased worked with good
profits and dividends. Then Musick and
others of the stockholders filed bills to
set aside the sale and have the property restored to the old company.
The court decided : That the directors
had power to borrow money of one of
their number, and to execute to him a
mortgage on the corporate property.
That the debt could be collected by a
sale of property to raise a sum sufficient
to psy it. That the directors and other
promoters of the new company had the
right to purchase MNusick's bonds, stock
and claims, and also the certificate of
purchase given at tilemechanic's lien
sale. "If tile
company," says WALKI-R,
C. J., "had po~sesscd money or property
or any assets that could be converted
into money with which to redeem and
discharge the debts, then these purchases
would have been in bad faith ; but there
were no such means, the company was
hopelessly insolvent, and its final dissolution was at hand. The stockholders
had been called together and they were
urged to make advances in proportion to
the stock they severally held, and thus
relieve the company and preserve its
existence, but this they refused to do;
and as it could not be preserved, and
must come to an end by a sale under
the power in the'trust-deed, no reason
is perceived why appellants [directors
and other promoters] might not become
the purchasers at the sale."
To the point that, more property
having been sold than was sufficient to
pay the bonded indebtedness of the company, the sale was excessive, the court
replied that only $70 more than such
indebtedness was hidden for the land,
shaft, railroad tracks and mining rights,
and that the remaining property was
but mere chattels, valueless except for
use in connection with the mine.
"When the company," say the court,

"had been reduced to this situation,
what was the plain, moral and legal
duty of the directors? Surely, every
person would without hesitation, say,
property and
sell the remainder of tile
pay the debts of the company."
As to whether the directors could become purchasers at their own sale, the
court said : " Until the bonded debts
were satisfied, the sale was that of
Musick for the benefit of the holders of
the bends," all of which were not owned
"But when the sale
by directors.
amounted to a sufficient sum for that
purpose, all that was subsequently sold
was by MN"usick as auctioneer of appellants [directors], and they purchased
at their own sale. This they could not
do, any more than they could fix a
price on the property and appropriate it
to their own use, which the law has
never sanctioned with persons occupying
the relation they did to stockholders.
The sale, then, of property over and
above what was necessary to pay the
bonded indebtedness, was void, inasmuch as it was purchased by the directors of the company:" Harts v.
Brown, supra.
Finally, directors may, in any of the
usual ways, become creditors of their
corporations. But if they buy up depreciated claims against it after its insolvency, they are creditors, not for the
face value of such claims, but for the
sum they actually pay for them. As
creditors they cannot prefer themselves,
either by actual preferential. payments
of corporate funds, or by mortgage or
other transfer, direct or indirect, of the
corporate property to themselves. -Perhaps an exception exists as to the surplus property o funds of a solvent company which may, it appears, be set aside
to pay or secure a director or one occupying his position.
Nor can directors, by refusal to permit a transfer of shares, or by any other
sort of duress which their position as
directors gives them power to exercise,

HUBBELL v. DREXEIL
compel payments to be made' on their
claims in preference to others. Especially have directors, whether creditors
or not, no right to enter into any scheme
for a collusive sale and sacrifice of their

company's property. And all their
proceedings as parties to any combination or "ring" for such purposes, will
be set aside in equity.
AIELBEIT HAMIILTON.

Chicago.

Circuit Court, Eastern .Distrietof Pennsylvania.
HUBBELL v. DREXEL.
The pledgee of shares of stock, in the absence of a specific agreement to the
contrary, is entitled to have the shares transferred to his own name on the books
of the company, and where such transfer is made he is not bound to retain the identical shares pledged, so long as he keeps on hand an equal number of similar shares
to answer the pledgor's demand on repayment of the loan.
A share of stock is without. ear-marks, and undistinguisbable from the other shares
of the same corporation and issue, the certificates bearing dates and numbers, being
but evidence of title.

BILL in equity fild in December 1880, by W. W. Hubbell

against Drexel & Co, to compel the transfer to the plaintiff of
1702 shares of Pennsylvania Railroad stock.
The case was heard upon bill, answer and proofs, from which it
appeared that at different times between March 14th and July 17th
1877, plaintiff had deposited with defendants various shares of
Pennsylvania Railroad stock as collateral security for loans; that
on said date a settlement was had by which it appeared that the
number of plaintiff'Vs shares so held by defendants was 1602; that
on the same day plaintiff executed to defendants a demand note
for the amount of the loans, with condition that upbn default the
holder might sell the collaterals without further notice, at public
or private sale.
It also appeared that shortly after the settlement of July 17th
1877, the market-value of the stock having declined, the defendants called upon the plaintiff for additional margin, and he being
unable to furnish it, the defendants, with his consent, sold 600
shares 'out of.the collateral they held. The stock left by the plaintiff with the defendants as collateral was immediately thereafter
transferred into their name, and new certificates issued to them.
In September 1877, it appeared from the testimony that these
particular certificates were transferred out of the name of Drexel
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& Co. into that of sundry other parties; but by the evidence
offered by the defendants, it appeared that this transfer was made
simply for convenience in the deliveries, and that the defendants,
always had on band a much greater number of shares, out of which
they could have returned to Mr. Hubbell his shares upon the repayment of his loan.
In April 1878, the defendants having notified the plaintiff to
pay his note, upon his default, after due notice, sold the remaining
shares at public auction at an average price of 28J. After crediting the plaintiff with the proceeds of this sale, there remained an
indebtedness due the defendants of $1600.
Plaintiff alleged that in the settlement of July 17th, defendants
had failed to account for 100 of the shares, and that defendants
had agreed not to enforce the condition of the note, but to carry
the stock for plaintiff. Plaintiff further charged that the transfer
of the stock by defendants to their own names before default, and
their failure to retain in their possession the identical shares
pledged was a fraud on plaintiff's rights.
TV. 1V. iubbell, for plaintiff.
Samuel Dickson, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BUTLER, J.-(After discussing the questions of fact as to the
error in the settlement and the agreement to carry the stock, and
deciding them in favor of defendants.) The allegation that the
defendants procured a transfer of part of the stock to themselves,
on the books of the company, immediately on receiving the certificates from him, is immaterial. It was plainly their right to do
so. If he desired to avoid this he should have contracted accordingly. When thus transferred, it was unnecessary and impossible
to disti'nguish between these shares and others held by the defendants. It is of ho consequence, therefore, that in selling stock they
may have disposed of these particular shares. They at all times
had in hand an amount greatly in excess of the shares received
from the plaintiff, and were therefore constantly prepared to keep
their contract with him. A share of stock is without" ear-marks,"
and cannot therefore be distinguished, as has just been said, from
others of the same corporation and issue. The certificates, bearing
dates and numbers, are but evidence of title. On payment of his
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debt the plaintiff would have been entitled to a return of the number of shares which the defendants had received-nothing more.
Such was the effect of his contract: 2Nourse v. Prime, 4 Johns.
Oh. Rep. 490; Allen v. Dykers, 3 Hill 598 ; Gilpin v. Howell,
5 Barr 41.
For these reasons the bill must be dismissed, with costs.
McKENNAN,

J., concurred.

A question of considerable practical
importance was decided in the principal
case, namely: that the pledgee of shares
of stock, in the absence of a specific
agreement to the contrary, may transfer
the stock to his own name on the books
of the company, and when so transferred,
the, particular shares become undistinguishable from the common mass; and
the pledger is not entitled to the returh
of the identical shares pledged.
Tils decision was grounded upon the

fact that shares of stock are without any
ear-mark, and consequently cannot be
distinguished from other like shares of
the same corporation; it being of no
consequence that each certificate may
have a different date or number, since
the certificate is only the evidence of
title.
The decision, which is no doubt perfectly correct, was probably based upon
the remarks of J3ELL,

J.,

in Gilpin v.

Nowell, 5 Penn. St. 41. In that case the
judge in the court below charged the
jury, that the plaintiff could recover, if
the defendants, the holders of stock of
the Girard Bank as collateral security
from the plaintiff, had either parted with
the Girard Bank stock pledged to them
or thrown it undistinguished into the
general mass of their own stock, or that
of other persons in their custody, so as
to be unable to discriminate the identical
shares of stock originally purchased for
the plaintiff. "It is, in general, true,"
said BELL,, J., on appeal, " that where
tie pledge is distinctive in its character,
and therefore capable of being recognised
among other things of a like nature, or

where a mark is set upon it with a view to
its discrimination, the pledgee is bound
to redeliver the identical article pledged,
and cannot substitute something of a like
kind unless so authorized by the contract.
But I think there is a manifest difference
ex necessitate, where the thing pledged,
from its very nature, is incapable, in
itself, of identification, if once mingled
with other things of the same kind. In
such case, it is the duty of the pledger
to put a mark upon it by which it may
be distinguished ; for, as is said in Nourse
v. Prime et al., 4 Johns. Ch. 490, if a
person will suffer his property to go into
a common mass without making some
provision for its identification, he has no
right to ask more than that the quantity
he put in should always be there and
ready for him. By a just fiction of law,
that residuum shall be presumed to be the
portion he put in. The good sense of
these remarks made in immediate reference to a pledge of shares of bank stock,
recommend them to our adoption. They
are repeated by Chancellor KENT in the
s. c., reported in 7 Johns. Ch. 69, and
noticed with approbation by NELsoN,
0. 3., in Allen v. Dykers, 3 Hill .(N. Y.)
593. Speaking of N%7ourse v. Rime, he
says, 'as it appeared the defendants
always had on hand the requisite quantity of shares, the law will presume the
shares so on hand, from time to time,
were the shares deposited, because the
parties have not reduced the shares to
any more certainty.' It may be, that
even in a pledge of stock which frequently passes from hand to hand with
almost as little ear-mark as money itself,
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the pledger may identify and stipulate
for a return of the very same stock, by
handing his ce'rtificate to the pledgee
with a blank power to transfer, not to
be used except on a failure to redeem or
in some other mode devised for the same
purpose. But where, as here, the shares
pledged never stood in the name of the
pledger, but passed at once from the
former owner to the pledgee, without
anything done by the former to set them
apart from other like shares of the latter
or even a request to this effect, it is not
perceived how, with any show of reason,
it can be made the subject of complaint,
that the pledge necessarily was mingled
with the other similar stock of the
*
* As already intimated,
pawnee. *
under the circumstances of this case,
nothing further was incumbent on the
defendants than to have at all times
under their control the requisite number
of shares ready to be transferred to the
plaintiff when legally demanded, unless,
indeed, it wxas the agreement and understanding of the parties, that the defendants, until the money borrowed was repaid, should deal with the pledged stock
as if it was their own. In such case it
would be within the power of the
pledgees to sell or otherwise dispose of
it pending the loan."
In Neilerv. Kelley, 69 Penn. St. 409,
in an action of trover by the pledger of
stock to recover for a wrongful conversion by the pledgees in selling tie same
without notice to the pledger, the debt
being due and unpaid, SHaswoonD, J.,
said: "The defendants below were at
no time under any obligation to deliver
these stocks and bonds specifically to the
plaintiff. He never had put himself in
a position to demand them before- the
bringing the suit, or up to the time of
trial, by tendering or offering to pay the
amount of his indebtedness to tile defendants. Had the action been detinue or
replevin, lie must have failed entirely.
* **
Where a plaintiff seeks to fasten
a responsibility for more than the usual

measure of damages, he must also fasten
upon the defendants the duty or oligation to deliver specifically the stock or
securities at some particular time, and
their refusal to fulfil that duty. Non constat tlint upon a demand and tender,
the defendants would not have been able
to deliver to the plaintiff similar stocks
and securities, as, according to Gilpin v.
Howell," supra.
In Nevada in Boylan v. Huguet, 8
Nev. 345, the same rule was laid down,
the court holding that, in the ordinary
transactions between principals and
brokers, the former were not entitled
to receive the identical shares purchased on their account by the brokers,
and that the brokers were acting within
the terms of their contracts with their
principals, so long as they were ready
to deliver, on demand and payment,
certificates representing the requisite
J., said :
number of shares. W nrIwAN,
"So long as he (tie broker) held a
certificate or certificates representing
the requisite number of shares and
was prepared to deliver them, on payment and demand, so long was lie within
the terms of his contract; and though
he might have used and reused the
identical certificates received on filling
Boylan's (the principal's) orders, mixed
them with others, destroyed them even,
there was no conversion until he, or as
in this case, his voluntary assignees, refused to deliver upon demand." See
also the charge of.the court in the case
of Fay v. Gray, 124 Mass. 500.
The American authorities thus seem
to be harmonious. There is a case,
however. decided in England which, at
the first blush, might seem to be authority for a different rule.

In Langton v. Waite, L. R., 6 Eq.
C. 165, A. & B., stockbrokers, her
rowed, on behalf of the plaintiff; a sum
of money for a term of three months
from the defendants, also stockbrokers,
upon the security of certain shares of
stock, which were transferred to the
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name of one of the defendant's firm.
Before the end of the term, the plaintiff,
having contracted to sell the stock, applied to the defendants for a retransfer
of it, tendering the amount of the debt
in full with interest. The defendants,
having sold the stock, rerused to return
it or silar shares, alleging that the
loaif was made for the full term, and the
-plaintiff in consequence of the refusal
of the defendants, was obliged to go
into the market and buy other shares, at
a loss to himself, to complete his contract
of sale. At the expiration of the term,
the defendants, having bought other
similar shares at a lower figure, tendered
the amount of the security to the plaintiff. A rule of the Stocl. Exchange to
the effect that "in all cases of loans on
the deposit of security, the lender is
bound to return the identical securities
deposited, unless it be otherwise stipulated at the time of making the loan;
but this liability does not apply to a
member who has taken in stock or
shares upon continuation at the market
price," was offered in evidence in an
action by the plaintiff to recover' the
amount of profit realized by the defendants from the use they had made of his
stock; and tile court held that the rule
was conclusive on the subject ; that the
pledgee was bound to return the identical shares pledged, and that, the sale of
the pledge being a wrongful conversion,
the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
The court added that an alleged custom
for a pledgee to sell pledged stock being
in direct oppoesition to the express rule
was bad, and also observed that the
pledgee had no right by tl e common law
to sell the stock pledged, citing Ezparte
Dennison, 3 Vesey 552.
In reading this case carefully, it will
be observed that it went off on the fact
of there being an expres rule of the
Stock Exchange on the subjects forbidding re-hypothecation, and that a custom
of the Stock Exchange'to the contrary
And besides the
could not prevail.

case, according to the principle of the
American cases, must have been decided
in the plaintiff's favor, as evidently the
pledgees did not keep on hand a sufficient number of shares to satisfy the
amount of security deposited, on demand
and payment of the loan. So that notwithstanding the remarks of MALINs,
V. C., which were not necessary to the
decision of the question, this decision
cannot be taken to militate against the
rule laid down in the principal case or
in those we have adverted to.
It will be seen in the foregoing eases
that the shares were actually transferred
to the pledgee. Suppose, however, the
pledger merely handed the certificates
to tile pledgee with a power of attorney
in blank to transfer, and the pledgee
did not have them transferred to his own
name, would the pledger be entitled to
the identical certificates lie had pledged
on demand and tender of payment ?
This is a question that is perhaps scarcely
worth while to do more than suggest,
as the damage, like shares being equal
in valsie, would be not material, the
pledger having suffered none by a return
of other like shares.
If the pledgee of stock, always keeping sufficient amount on hand to satisfy
the pledges may sell the shares pledged
to him, he certainly can pledge them,
though in the state of Pennsylvania
there is a statute against all hypothecation of stock by the pledgee, which
makes it a penal offence ; see Act of
May 25th 1878 (P. L. 155), somewhat
modified -by the supplement passed on
Jhne 10th 1881 (P. L. 1881, 107), excepting from the operation of the Act
of 1878, the hypothecation of stock not
fully paid for, and carried by the broker.
A somewhat kindred question of considerable interest is also suggested by the
points raised in the principal case as
well as by the late case of Cherry v.
Frost, 21 Am. Law Rteg. (N. S.) 57,
and the interesting note to that case.
The annotator of that case considered
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"the position of the sub-pawnce * * *
without notice, of a non-negotiable sccurity," and it is our intention to go a
step further and consider the two broad
propositions, viz. :first, whether a party,
who has deposited an article for the security of a debt, can, on" the pawnee

re-hypothecating the same, treat tile original contract of pawn at an end, so as to
bring an action of detinue or trover
against the sub-pawnee without tendering the amount of the ;riginal debt for
-which tile security was given, and
Secondly, if such re-hypothecation does
not terminate the contract of pawn,
whether a party, with whom an article
has been left as a security for tile payment of money, has a right to transfer
his interest in tile thing pledged (subject
to the right of redemption in the pawner)
to a third party.
It must be borne in mind, as was remarked in the late case of Donald v.
Sucling, L. R., 1 Q. B. 618, that
we are not dealing with tile case of a
lien, which is merely the right to retain
possession of tile chattel, and which
right is immediately lost on the possession being pr-ted with, unless to a person who may be considered as tile agent
of the party having the lien for the purpose of its custody. There is a great
ditfereuce in tills respect between a
pledge and a lien. The authorities are
clear that a right of lien, properly so
called, is a mere personal right of detention, and that an unaudiorized transfer of the thing does not -transfer that
personal right. Tile cases which established in England before the Factor's
Acts, that a pledge by a factor gave his
pledgee no right to retain the goods
even to file extent to which the factor
was in advance, proceed oi tiis ground.
In Daiddgny v. Duval, 5 Term Rep.
606, BULLER, J., proceeded on tile
ground tlat "a lien is a personal right
and cannot be transferred to another."
In Legg v. Erans, 6 M. & W. 36,
where an action of trover was brought
VOL. "X..-58

against a sleriff of Middlesex, to recover some pictures, who justified under
an execution,- the plaintiff replied by
setting up a lien on the goods, which
was held good on demurrer. PARxE,
B., said : "1If we consider the nature
of a lien and the right which it confers,
it will be evident that it cannot form the
subject-matter of a sale. A lien is a
personal right which cannot be parted
with, and continues only so long as the
possessor holds tile goods. It is clear,
therefore, that the sheriff cannot sell an
interest of this description wlicl is a
personal interest in the goods." And
in McCombie v. Davies, 7 East 6, Lord
ELLE nBOROUG1I remarked that " nothing
could be clearer than that liens were
personal and could not be transferred
to third persons h any tortious pledge
of the principal's goods."
In Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.
916, Lord HOLT is reported to have said
that a "pawnece has a special property,
for tile pawn is a securing to tie pawnee
that lie siall be repaid his debt, and to
And
compel tie pawnor to pay him."
again in 3ores v. Conhamn, Owen 123.
the court used language to the same
effect, saying, that tile pawnor "hath
such interest in tile pawn as lie may
assign over, and tile assignee shall he
subject to detinue if he detains it upon
payment of tile money by tile owner.
In Donald v. Suckling, supra, the majority of the court relied principally on
the case of Johnson v. Stear, 15 C. B.
(N. S.) 330. There, one Cumming, a
bankrupt, had deposited with the defend:
ant two hundred anid forty-thrce cases
of brandy, to be held by him as a security for the payment of an acceptance of
tile bankrupt, discounted by the defendant, and which would become due on
January 29th. and in the event of such
acceptance not being paid at maturity,
lie was to be at liberty to sell the brandy
and apply the proceeds to the payment
of the acceptance. On January 28th,
the defendant contracted to sell the
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brandy to a third party and delivered
him the dock-warrant on the 29th, and
on the 30th the third party got possession. An action of trover was brought
by the assignee of the bankrupt, and the
majority of the court beld (EnLa, C. J.,
BYLEs and KEATING, J. ; WiLmiAmS,
J., dissentiente), that tl-e
plaintiff was
only entitled to nominal damages, because "the deposit of the goods in
question with the defendant to secure
repayment of a loan on- a given day,
with a power to sell in dase of default
on that day, created 'an interest and a
right of property in the goods which
was more than a Mere lien; and the
wrongful act of the pawnee did not annihilate the contract between the parties.
nor the interest of the pawnee in the
goods under the contract."
In Donald v. Suckling, stipra, it was
held by the court (IELLOn and BLAcCminx, JJ., and CocrUinx, C. J. ;
SHEn, J., dissentiente,) that, where debentures had been deposited as security
for the payment of a bill of exchange,
with a right on the part ef the depositor
to dispose of them on ths non-payment
of, the bill when due, and the pawnee
re-hypothecated them to a third party for
a valuable consideration, the original
pawnor, while the bill was still unpaid,

could not maintain an action of detinue
against the latter for the recovery of the
debentures, without first tendering him
the amount of the bill. In the course
of his opinion, BLACKDURN, J., said :
"'Story, in his treatise on Bailments,
sect. 327, says, ' But whatever doubt
may be indulged as to the case of a
factor, it has been decided, that is, in
America, that in rce of a strict pledge,
if the pledgee transfers" Ihe same to his
own creditors, thq latter may hold the
pledge until the debt of the original
owner is discharged.' In Whitak er on
Liens, published in 1812, p. 140, the
-law is laid down to be that the pawnee
has a special property beyond a lien.
I do not cite this as an authority of

great weight, but as showing that' this
was an existing opinion in England
before Story wrote his treatise. * * *
Now, I think that the subpledging of
goods held in security for money, before
the money is due, is not in general so
inconsistent - with the contract as to
amount to a renunciation of that contract. There may be cases in which the
pledger has a special, personal confidence in the pawnce, and, therefore,
stipulates that tlie pledge shall be kept
by him alone; but no such terms are
stated here, and I do not think that any
such term is implied by law. In general, all that the pledger requires is the
personal contract of the pledgee that, in
bringing the money the pawn shall be
given up to him, and that in the meantime the pledgee shall be responsible for
due care being taken for its safe custody.
This may very well he done though
there has been a sub-pledge."
There are not many American decisions on this question, because, as is
pointed out by the annotator to Cherry
v. Frost, 21 Am. Law fReg. 66, the
cases that have arisen in respect to the
re-hypothecation of securities have gone
off on the question of estoppel, as for
instance, McNeil v. Tenth National
Bank, 46 N. Y. 325 ; Jarvis v. Rogers,
13 Mass. 105;' Wood's Appeal, 8
Weekly Notes Cases (Phila.) 441;
but in Talty v. Freedman's Saivings
and Trust Co., 3 Otto (U. S.) 321,
SWAYNE, J., approved

the ruling in

Donald v. Suckling, supra.
In Thompson v. atri k, 4 Watts
(Pa.) 414, however, the court said,
"The principles of the present action
have long been settled, in Mores v.
Conlan, Owen 123; Anon., 2 Salk.
522, and Coggs v. Bernard, 3 Salk.
268. As' a pawnee has a special property in the thing pawned, he 'may
assig-n it; and his assignee may consequently assert his title to it against
the owner, or one standing in his place.
He may even use the pawn, provided
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it be not- the worse for it, if the keeping
of it be a charge to him * * * ."
In Bank v, Trenholm, 12 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 520, an action of trover was
held to lie against a factor, as pledgee,
or against his sub-pledgee, without
notice, though he pledged but up to his
lien.
In First Nat. Bank of Louisville v.
Bryce, 19 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 503,
it was held that a re-pledge of goods by
a factor terminates the contract of pledge,
though the sub-pledgee has a right of
set-off against the original pledgor.
The court here considered the position
of a factor who had Inade advances and
that of a pledgee analogous.
In considering the point involved in
the second question of our note, namely,
conceding the contract of pledge is not
terminated on the original pawnee rehypothecating the article pawned, is it
such a breach of the contract of pawn,
as to enable the original pawnor to
bring an action for damages against the
original pawnee therefor.
Thompson v. Patrick, supra, was an
action of trover by the sub-pawnee, to
recover possession of a set of harness
loaned him by the pawnee; against one
Th(mpson, the original pawnee's agent,
who had surreptitiously obtained possession of it; and it was held that,
though the use of the harness by the
sub-pawnee might have deteriorated the
value of it, yet Thompson "could not
retain the possession of it, surreptitiously obtained, against the pawnee
or the plaintiff in his stead." The
court said the pawnee may use the
pawn, but at his peril. "But though
lie use it even tortiously, lie is answerable for the consequences but by action.
It has not indeed been expressly ruled
that an improper use of it does not work
a forfeiture of his lien ; but neither is
there any determination to the contrary,
and the reason as well as the justice of
the thing, is strong to show that he
ought ndt to-oce his security for a sub-

stantial debt by having caused perhaps
an inconsiderable damage, for which
there is an independent remedy graduated to the exact mepture of it."
In Donald v. Suckling, supra, the
point under consideration was not decided. BLACKDURN, J., 'said, that in
England there were strong authorities to
the effect that the contract of pledge,
when perfected by delivery of possession, created an interest in the pledgee
that might be assigned. MLaLOn, J.,
said, "I think that, when the true distinction between the case of a deposit by
way of pledge of goods for securing the
payment of money and all cases of lien,
correctly so described, is considered, it
will be seen that in, the former there is
no implication, in general, of a contract
by the pledgee to retain the personal
possession of the goods deposited ; and
I think that, although he (the pawnee)
cannot confer upon any third person a
better title or a greater interest than lie
possesses ; yet if, nevertheless, he does
pledge the goods to a third person for a
greater interest than lie possesses, such
an pet does not annihilate the contract
of pledge between himself and the
pawnor; but that the transaction is
simply inoperative as against the original pawnor, who, upon tender of the debt
secured, immediately becomes entitled
to the possession of the goods, and can
recover in an action for any special
damage which lie may have sustained by
reason of the act of the pawnee in repledging the goods."
Coottaunx, 0. J., however, remarked, "I think it unnecessary to
the decision in the present case, to
determine whether a party, with whOm
an article has been pledged as a security
for the payment of money, has a right to
transfer his interest in the thing pledged
(subject to the right of redemption in
the pawnor) to a third party. I should
certainly hesitate to lay down the affirmative of that proposition. Such a
right in the pawnee seems' quite incon-
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sistent with the undoubted right of the
pledgor to have the thing pledged
returned to him immediately on the
tender of the amount for which the
pledge was given. In some instances
it may well be inferred from the nature
of the thing pledged-as ir the case of a
valuable work of art-that the pawnor,
though perfectly willing that the article
should be entrusted to the custody of
the pawnee, would not have parted
with it on the terms that it should be
passed on to others, and committed to
tilecustody of strangers. * * * I am
of opinion that the transfer of the pledge
does not put an end to the contract,, but
amounts only to a breach of contract,
upon which the owner may bring an
action ; for nominal damroge if he has
stistained no substantial damage ; for
substantial damages, if the thing pledged
is damaged in the hands of the third
party, or the owner is prejudiced by
delay in not having the thing delivered
to him on tendering the amount for
which itwas pledged."
In the late case of Haliday v. Holgate, L. R., 3 Esch. 299, A. deposited
certificates of scrip with the defendant
as security for a loan, and, on his
becoming bankrupt, the defendant sold
the scrip without demand or notice, to
repay himself the debt. The creditor's
assignee, without making a tender of
the debt, brought an action of trover
against the defendant, and the court
held, that the action would not lie.
WILLS,J., said, "It has been argued
that the plaintiff is at any rate entitled
to nominal damages, for that a conversion was committed by the sale of
the certificates.
That sale, it is contended, had the effect of putting an end
to the bailment of pledge ; the property
of the pledgee was thereby determined,
so as to enable the assignte to say that,
at the moment when the stle took place,
lie becamp entitled to the certificates by
virtue of the general property which was
then revested in him. This reasoning

proceeds upon a somewhat subtle and
narrow ground, for it is admitted that
the assignee could claim only nominal
damages. But we cannot arrive at the
conclusion that he is so entitled without
getting rid of the case of Donald v.
Suckling,"

supra. *

*

*

"There

are

three kinds of security : the first, a simple lien; the second, a mortgage
passing the property out and out; the
third, a security intermediate between a
lien and a mortgage, viz., a pledge,
where, by the contract, a deposit of
goods is made a security for a debt, and
the right to the property vests in the
pledgee so far as is"
necessary td secure
the debt. It is true, th6 pledgor has
such a property in the article pledged as
lie can convey to a third person, but he
has no right to the goods without paying
off the debt, and until the debt is paid
off the pledgee has the whole present
interest. If he deals with it in a manner other than is allowed by law for the
payment of his debt, then, in so far as
by disposing of the reversionary interest
of the pledgor, he causes to the pledgor
any difficulty in obtaining possession of
the pledge on payment of the sum due,
and thereby does him any real damage,
he commits a legal wrong against the
pledgor. But it is a contradiction in
fact, and would be to call a thing that
which it is not, to say that the pledgee
consents, by his act, to revest in the
pledgor the immediate interest or right
in the pledge, which, by the bargain, is
out of the pledgOr and in the pledgee.
Therefore, for any such wrong, an
action of trover or of detinue, each of
which assumes an immediate right to
possession in the plaintiff is not maintainable, for that right clearly is not in
the plaintiff."
A consideration of the foregoing cases
seems to show that, in England at
least, a sub-pledge of the article pledged,
does not terminate the contract of pledge
so that an action of detinue or trover
would lie by the pawnor against the

CHATARD v. 0'DONOVAN. pawnee, or his assignee, without first
tendering the amount of the debt which
the pledge was given to secure. At the
same time it is difficult to find an authority to the effect that a sub-pledge
is legal.

It is true that the English authorities
have held that, without a tender of the
amount of the debt, an action of detinue
or trover would not lie against the pawnee or his assignee, but that was because
of certain technical reasons; and Donald
v. Sucling, supra, and Halliday v.
Holgate, supra, are not authorities for
the proposition that it is not a breach.of
the contract of pawn, for the pawnee to
re-hypothecate the article pledged.
In some of the United States the
technical English rule has not been followed, and in Work v. Bennett, 70
Penn. St. 484, an action of trover was
successfully brought to recover damages
for an alleged illegal conversion by a
sub-pledge of the article pawned, and
sale by thp sub-pledgee without a tender of the amount of the debt. Srn nswooD, J., said: "Had the stock
and bonds (the pledge) which were the

subject of this action of trover, remained unconverted in the hands of the
defeidants, tho plaintiff could not have
recovered without a tender of the
amount of the debt for which they were
then pledged, or proof of payment of
such debt. But they had wrongfully
converted them by pledging them for
their own debt, and a sale afterwards
by their pledgees, without notice to the
plaintiff. This dispensed with any
tender before suit brought.

* *

* "

Here a recoupment for the balance due
defendant from the damages for the conversion was allowed. Apparently the
case of Thompson v. Patrid, 4 Watts
414, was not cited on the argument,
nor considered by the court.
In New York, Tennessee and Kentucky the courts also seem to consider
re-hypothecation by the pawnee as
illegal ; see Bank v. Trenholm, 12
Heisk. (Tenn.) 529; Allen v. Dykers
et al., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 593; Bank v.
Bryce, supra; but see, Wood v. Hayes
375; Fay
et al., 15 Gray (Mfass.)
v. Gray, 124 Mass. 500, and Thompson
v. Patrick, supra.
AnTnuR BIDDLE.

Supreme Court of hnazana.
CHATARD v. O'DONOVAN.
Where a Catholic priest is subject to be remove4 at the pleasure of the bisho!5
having charge over him, he is not entitled to a notice to quit the parsonage of the
parish over which h6 had charge, under a statute requiring a notice from landlord
to tenant.
The relationship, in such case, of the priest and bishop, is that of master and
servant, and not that of landlord and tenant.
The right of occupancy of the parsonage by the priest, in such case, is only incidental to his charge over the parish, and when he is deprived of the latter the former
is gone.

APPEAL from the Hendricks Circuit Court.
This was an action by appellant to recover of the appellee the
possession of certain real estate. The complaint set forth that, on,
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July 20th 1876, the Right Reverend Maurice De St.'Palais was
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Vincennes ; that according to the
rules, regulations and customs of the Roman Catholic Church, it is
the duty of the bishop to supervise the congregations in his diocese, and to control, hold and own all the real and personal property in use by said congregations; to exercise authority over the
pastors in charge of such congregations, and in the exercise of his
discretion, to continue such pastors in their position or to suspend
or remove them' therefrom; that upon the suspension or removal
of such pastors, it was their duty, according to the laws, rules,
regulations and customs of the Roman Catholic Church, to deliver
and surrender to the bishop all the property, real and personal, in
their occupancy or possession as such pastors ; that on' the date
above mentioned, the real estate in controversy was conveyed to
said Maurice De St. Palais, in trust for the Catholic congregation
of- Brownsburg, Indiana; that said congregation -was an unincorporated congregation, subject to the ecclesiastical authority,
jurisdiction and control of 'the said bishop; that on June 28th
1877, said Maurice De St. Palais, died, leaving by his will the said
property to the Archbishop of Cincinnati upon like trusts; that
on March 26th 1878, the plaintiff, Francis Silas Chatard, was.
duly appointed Bishop of Vincennes to succeed the said Maurice
De St. Palais, and that on October 30th 1878, the'said archbishop'
conveyed to him the said property upon the same trusts; that in
the year 1877, the defendant, Dennis O'Donovan, a priest of the
Roman Catholic Church, had been appbinted to the position of
pastor of the said Roman Catholic congregation at Brownsburg by
the said Maurice De St. Palais, and as such pastor, at the date of
the appointment of plaintiff as bishop, was occupying the premises
in question for a parsonage and for a house for religious worship;
that on December 15th 1880, the plaintiff, in the exercise of his:
discretion as bishop, removed the said defendant from tire position
of pastor of said congregation, and on April 26th 1881, caused a,
written notice to be served on him to deliver up to plaintiff possession of the said real estate at the expiration of one month from
that time; that although the month had expired defendant refused
to surrender possession of said'real estate, and had prevented the'
members of the congregation '(and the priest sent by plaintiff) from
occtpying the same; that the'time given for removal was a
reasonable time,. and that plaintiff was entitled., to:hovo .ppssessiol .,
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To this complaint defendant demurred. The court below sustained the demurrer, and plaintiff appealed.
Charles Poley and Baker, Hord .HHendricks, for appellant.
No counsel appeared for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODS, J.-We have no brief from the appellee. It is stated
in the appellant's brief that the ruling of the Circuit Court was
put upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint showed
the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties, and that
sects. 2 and 3 of the act concerning that relation (2 R. S. 1876,
p. 338; R. S. 1881, p. 1128), made it a tenancy from year to
year, determinable by a three months' notice prior to the expiration of a current year.
The question thus presented is plainly an important one, not
only as the decision may Affect the policy and administration of
the affairs of the church directly concerned, and perhaps other
church societies which furnish houses for the use of their pastors,
rectors and preachers, but the owners and occupants of real property generally. For it -is readily conceivable that in many
instances the owner and tenant will be, in all essential respects,
in the same legal relation as the parties to this record; as, for
example, the servant brought into the dwelling, or upon the
premises of the employer, and, as an incident to the employment,
allotted a room or tenement to occupy while the service lasts; the
mechanic or laborer who, by the terms of his engagement, has the
possession or use of a house belonging to the employer, and for
which the rent is to be deducted from his wages, or for which he is
to pay no specified rent, and makes compensation only by accepting less wages than he would receive if he occupied a house of
his own.
While these supposed cases, like the one before us, show the
parties in relations somewhat like the ordinary relation of landlord
and tenant, they are yet clearly and broadly distinguishable therefrom. The case of Kerrains v. People, 60 N. Y. 221, is instructive. If was there held that, "Where the occupation of a house
by a servant is connected with the service, or is required by the
employer for the necessary or better performance of the service,
the occupation is as servant, not as tenant, and the possession is
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that of the master." In the course of the opinion in the case,
CHURCH, 0. J., says: "Such, clearly, was the case of Haywood
v. Miller,.3 Hill 90, where a farmer hired a man and his wife to
work a farm for wages. The occupation of the house was necessary to the performance of the service; and The People v. Annis,
45 Barb. 304, was sabstantially the same, although I am unable to
agree with the learned judge who delivered the opinion in that
case, that immediately upon the termination of the service,
a 'tenancy at will, or by sufferance springs up." * * * "The
question depends on the nature of the holding, whether it is
exclusive and independent of and in no way connected with
the service, or whether it is so connected or is necessary for its
performance. And this, I think, is the result of all the cases.
The question has often arisen in England, under the poor laws, to
determine what occupation would confer a settlement, the courts
recognising, as controlling, the distinction between an occupant as
a tenant or as a servant." (Cases cited.). "The case of Hughes v.
Chatharn, 5 M. & G.'54, arose under the reform act, requiring a
registry of voters, the statute requiring that the person should
occupy as owner or tenant. * * * TINDAL, 0. J., in delivering
the opinion of the court, said: ' There is no inconsistency in the
relation of master and servant with that of landlord and tenant.
A master may pay his servant by conferring on him an interest in
real property, either in fee for years or at will, or for any other
estate or interest, and if he do so, the servant then becomes
entitled to the legal incidents of the estate, as much as if it were
purchased for any other consideration.'

*

*

* 'And

as'there

is nothing in the facts stated to show that the claimant was
required to occupy the house for the performance of his services,
or did occupy in order to their performance, or, that it was conducive to that purpose more than any house which he might have
paid for in any other way than by his services; and as the case
expressly finds that he had the house as a part remuneration for
his services we cannot say that the conclusion at which the revising barrister has arrived is wrong."
"I have cited the language of the court," says CnuncH, C. J.,
"because it lays down concisely the correct rule for determining
the question involved in this class of cases." And proceeding
with a recital of the facts in the case before him, he adds: "The
inference from these facts is reasonable, if not irresistible, in the
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absence of any allowance for rent, that the house was intended to
be occupied by an employee for the benefit of the owner i'n carrying on the mill. The case thus presented is analogous to that of
a person employing a coachman or gardener, and allowing or
requiring him to reside in a house provided for that purpose on
the premises, or a farmer who hires a laborer for wages to work
his farm, and live in a house upon the same. In these cases the
character of the holding is clearly indicated by the facts."
"Many servants," says MANSFIELD, 0. J., in ing v. Stock,
2 Taunt. 339, "have houses given them to live in, as porters at
park gates. If a master turns away his servant, does it follow
that he cannot evict him till the end of the year." To the same
effect, see llcQuade v. Emmons, 38 N. J. L. 397; Doyle v.
Gi6bs, 6 Lans. 180.
While it may not be said upon the facts of the complaint, that
the defendant was the hired servant of his bishop, it does appear
that he was appointed to his position by, and held it at the discretion of, the bishop, and that his possession of the property was
only an incident to his appointment, the better to enable him to
discharge the duties of his office; and when in the exercise of that
discretion, which by the rules and customs of the church he had
the right to employ, the bishop removed the defendant from his
charge or pastorate over the congregation, his right to possession
of the property at once necessarily ceased.
If, under the circumstances, the parties should be deemed to
have come under a contract relative to each other, the plain meaning of the contract was, that when the defendant should cease to
be pastor, which might be at the will of his bishop, he should
cease forthwith to occupy the property, there being from the nature
of the case, no right of occupancy except as an incident to the performance of the duties of pastor. And if this be regarded as a
tenancy, it was a tenancy at will, and determined "by one
mouth's notice in writing delivered to the tenant," which notice
the complaint shows to have been given.
We are, however, of the opinion that the relation of the parties
was more like that of master and servant, the possession of the
priest being in fact the possession of his superior, the bishop, who
had power at any time, and upon his own judgment or discretion,
to remove one and install another in the office of pastor, and in the
possession of the property of the office.
VOL. ]=.-59
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The judgment is reversed with costs, and with instructions to
overrule the demurrer.
We are aware of no case where the
exact point involved in the principal
case has been decided ; nor did counsel
for the appellant, in a very lengthy brief,
cite one. The principle applied to the
relation of bishop and priest in the occupancy of church property, is that of
master and servant. It is true the complaint alleges that the defendant had been
served with one month's notice to quit;
but this averment and service of notice
was entirely unnecessary, since lie knew
what his duty was on removal from the
charge of the spiritual care of the parish,
and' that this duty involVed the necessity of delivering up the occupancy of
the church building and the parsonage
to the bishop or his successor. This
involves the important principle that,
where the party affLcted knows his duty,
or is bound to know it, notice to him of
it is not necessary.
The court very properly takes the
position that the occupancy of the
church and parsonage is only incident
to the right of having charge over the
parish; that when the latter is taken
away, the former must of necessity fall.
Underlying this is the doctrine recognised and enforced by all the courts
that, whenever questions of faith or discipline, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or
law have been decided by the proper
church officer or judicatory to which the
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decision as final,
and as binding on them, in their application to the ease before them.
So far as appears from the complaint,
the bishop had a.perfect right to remove
the priest whenever he saw fit, either
?vith or without cause. It is undoubtedly the true principle that, "in an
organized church, with written or
printed rules, and established doctrines
and modes of worship, the right is

qualified. The. continuance, power and
emoluments of the position depend on
the will of the church, the right is contingent and restricted, and as a thing
of value is very much lessened. The
sentence 'of the church judicatory, in a
proper case, deprives of the position,
and salary and emoluments are gone :"
Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509 ; s. a. 10
Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 295.
But this branch of the case has been
so often discussed in the pages of this
magazine, and by such able jurists,
that any further comments are unnecessary. There is undoubtedly some" conflict, as Judge REDFILD has shown in
his notes to cases, but in the main there
is no disagreement as to the general
principles governing the cases. Upon
this subject it is sufficient to call the
readers attention to the article of Ron.
W sIAu

LA-wRsNcx in 12 Am. Law

Reg. (N. S.) 201, on "The law of religious and church corporations in
Ohio;" and also generally upon religious societies and chtch corporations
in the same volume on pages 829, 536,
and in volume 13, page 65, by the same5'
author. We also call the reader's attention to the following cases : Lynd v.
ilfenziers, 8 Am. Lav Reg. 94; s. c. 33
N. 3. L. 162 (1866) ; Gardiu v.-Penidc,
9 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 210, and
note ; s. c. 5 Bush 110 (1868); Fulton
v. Farley, 9 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
401, and note; Chase v. heney, 10 Id.
295, and note; s. c. 58 Ill. 509 (1871)

;

Watson v. Jones. 11 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 430, and note; s. c. 13 Wallace 679 (1871) ; Hennessey v. ialsh,
15 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 264, and
note; s. c. 55 N. H. 515 (1875) ; Perry
v. Wheeler, 17 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
24, and note; s. a. 12 Bush 541 (1878).
All these notes were written by Judge
REDFIELD, except the last, which was
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written by Hon. I.

H. DANA, Jr., and:

part of the note to Chase v. Cheney,
which was written by B1. W. FULLER.
In addition to the above-cited cases
and those cited in the notes, we begleave to call attention to the following
recent cases upon the subject: McAuley's
Appeal, 77 Penn. St. 397; Feisel v.
Munzonieer, 10 Kan.
; Kinkead v.
AcKee, 9 Bush 535 ; First Presbyterian
Church of Louisville v. Wilson, 14 Id.
252; Venable v. Baptist Church, 25
Kalis. 177; Kilpatrick v. Graves, 51
Bliss. 432; Jones v. Wadsworth, 11.
Phila. H. 227 ; O'Harra v. Stack , 90
Penn. St. 477 ; Kerr's Appeal, 89 Id. 97.
As we have previously said, the principle announced in the principal case is
applicable to the relation of master and
servant, and not to landlord and tenant.
The court also takes occasion to say that
the same principle is applicable, in
addition to its application to the relation of master and servant, to the relation of "the mechanic or laborerr
who, by the terms of his engagement,
has the possession or use of a lcuse belonging to the employer, and for which
the rent is to be deducted from his
wages, or for which be is to pay no specific rent, and makes compensation only
by accepting less wages than lie would
receive if he occupied a house of his
own." If, in such case, the relation of
landlord and tenant exists, it must be by
the terms of the contract, and to that
recourse must be had in determining the
respective rights of the parties. If the
rental value of the house or shop occupied by the servant, laborer or mechanic, is only part pay for his services,
then -no. tenancy exists ; but if, on the
contrary, he is to receive so much for
hislabor, and pay back so'much per
month or week, for the use and occupation of the house or shop, and has complete control over the premises, that
relation does exist. We prdceed to cite
a few examples illustrating this principle.

Where the defendant hired the plain.

tiff for one year, on his farm, for the
sum of

$270,

and was

to furnish

him his house-room for himself and
family, a garden, and a pasture for a.

cow, it was held that this was not a
demise of the premises in the nature of a
lease, creating the relation of landlord
and tenant. People ex rd. Hubbard v.
Aunis, 45 Barb. 304, it was said that
the relation was simply that of employer
and employee, or master and servant,
and the house-room, garden and pasture
of the cow are parts merely of the contract for service, and operate as a
portion of the cousideration of that
agreement:
Comstock v. Dodge, 43
How. Pr. 97. So where one occupying
a house as a servant of the owner, upon
the termination of the service was permitted to retain possession upon payment
of rent until the condition of his wife
should allow her removal, it was held
it, the duration of the occupancy depending on a contingent future event,
the relation of tenancy at will, or by
sufferance, did not arise between the
parties, and that the occupant held as a
mere licensee for the time agreed, and
no notice to quit was necessary: Doyle
v. Gibbs, 6 Lans. 180. So where the
evidence showed that the plaintiff was
employed by the defendant by the
month ; that as compensation for the
services to be rendered by the plaintiff,
he was to receive from the defendant
$25 a month and the use of a house for
himself and family, so long as he might
work for the defendant in an acceptable
manner; that under this agreement the
plaintiff went into the occupancy of tie
house in question, the same being the
tenant house standing and being upon
the property owned -by the defendant,
and engaged as the servant .of the
defendant; that le contiiued in such
service and occupancy until tie defendlant becoming dissatisfied with the plain.
tiff, discharged him from his employment;
it Was held that the relation.of landlord
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and tenant did not exist. "TThe occupation of the house by McQuade and his
family was a part of his compensation
for the performance of his engagement
with the defendant; it does not show
any demise of the house ; the possession
of McQuade was the possession of his
employer, and when he was dismissed
from service, and the legal relation
existing between them thereby put to an
end, his right of occupancy was ended,
and his longer remaining on the premises
of his master was a trespass :" UcQuade
v. Emmons, 38 N. J. L. 397. This is also
true where the occupant is to receive a
part of the crop cultivated by himself as
his pay: Guest v. Opdykc, 31 N. J. L.
552 ; State, -Edgar pros., v. Jewell, 34
Id. 259. See lVilberv. Ssson, 53 Barb.
258; Putnam v. Wise, I Hill 247; Caswell v. Destrich, 15 Wend. 379 ; Dinehart v. Wilson, 15 Barb. 595.
See
Rollins v. Riley, 44 N. H. 9.
A number of English cases have
arisen upon the question of master and
servant, so far as it appertains to the
relation of landlord and tenant. Thus
by agreement between S. and M., it
was recited that S. was in possession of
a messuage, ihereon the sale of beer
had been for some time past, and was
then, carried on and conducted by U.
for and on S.'s account; that Al. was
desirous of carrying on and conducting
such trade for S., and which he had
agreed to for the consideration after
mentioned; and it was witnessed that
S. agreed, in consideration of a bondsman to be answerable for 501. in default
of payment by M., that M. should, from
the date of the agreement, enter upon
the premises, and carry on and conduct
thereon such trade for S., in the place
and manner and. with and upon the
same privileges and terms, as U. had
done, until the agreement should be determined by the notice after mentioned;
and Al. agreed, during all the time he
should carry on and conduct the trade
on the premises for S., that all the beer

which should be sold by M. on the premises should be taken by him from S., and
that Al. should not part with the trade
or occupation without the license of S. ;
that, when either party should be desirous of determining the agreement,
M., on receiving from S. a month's
notice, without being paid any money
or consideration by S., should quit and
deliver up to S. the trade and possessioh
of the premises, with all such fixtures
and things belonging to S. as should
then be thereon; and M. should be at
liberty to leave the trade and quit the
occupation on giving a month's notice to
S.
l. having entered into possession,
it was held that i. occupied not as tenant, but as servant to S., and could not
maintain trespass against S. for entering without a month's notice: Mayhew
v. Suttle, 4 El. & B1. 347.
So a servant put into occupation of a
cottage, with, less wages on that account,
does not occupy it as a tenant, but the
master may properly declare on it as his
own occupation in an action on the case
for a disturbance of a right of way over
the' defendant's close to such cottage.
And it made no difference that the cottage was divided into two parts, one of
which was only in the occupation of
such servant, the other being occupied
by a tenant paying rent: Bertie v.
Beaurnad, 16 East 33. See Doe v. Cartwright, 3 B. & A. 327.
As the court in KerrainsV. People remarked, a number of cases upon the
question of tenancy has arisen in Eng.
land under the poor laws. Thus where
a pauper was permitted by several persons having a right of common to occupy
a tenement of 101. a year, as a reward
for his service as a herd, it was held
that such holding constituted a tenancy:
King v. Melkridge, 1 Term 598.
This
case was followed in King v. .Minster, 3
l. & S. 276, where it was expressly
held that a servant receiving the use of
a part of his master's house as part pay
for his services did not constitute a ten-
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ancy; but where the servant permitted
a pauper living with him to hire a
couple of cows which were kept on the
land of the master, during the summer
months, and it did not appear that their
keeping was connected with the service,
it was held that the pauper acquired a
settlement, although if le had not had
the two cows he would not. But see
King v. Kelstern, 5 M. & S. 136, where
it was said, "if the occupation be unconnected with the service, it will confer
a settlement, but if it be necessarily connected with the service, as if it be necessary for the due performance of the
service, it shall .nbt confer a settlement." rer BAYLEY, J. See King v.
Cheshunt, 1 B. & Aid. 473.

The plaintiff was employed by the
Highgate Archway Company to collect
toll for them, and lived in the toll-house,
one shilling per week being deducted
from his wages by way of rent. The
company having ceased to collect toll
at that particular spot, the -plaintiff was
dismissed from their employ, and received a notice to leave the house, which
he promised to do. It was held that he
was not a tenant of the company, and
could not maintain trespass against the
agent for pulling down the toll-house:
Hunt v. Colson, 3 M. & Sc. 790; Rex
v. Lakenheath, I B. & C. 531 (case of
a schoolmaster.)
W. W. THoRTON.
Indianapolis, Ind.

Supreme Court of the United States.
AGER v. MURRAY.
A patent right may be subjected by bill in equity to the payment of a judgment
debt of the patentee.
A decree sustained which directed that in default of payment of the judgment
debt by a certain day the patent right should be sold and an assignment executed
to the purchaser by the debtor, and that in default of the debtor executing such assignment a suitable person should be appointed trustee to execute the same.

from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
This was a bill in equity by a- judgment-creditor to subject to
the payment of his debt the interest of his debtor in patent rights.
The case was heard in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon bill and answers, by which it appeaxs as follows:On the 10th of April 1876, Talbot C. Murray, in an action at
law upon a promissory note, recovered judgment against Wilson
Ager for the sum of $2164.66, with interest and costs. Upon
that judgment a writ of fierifacias was issued, and returned nulla
bona. Wilson Ager had no real or personal property in the district subject to execution at law, but was the owner of sundry.
letters patent issued to him by the United States for useful inventions, which, if sold, would produce more than enough money to
APPEAL
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satisfy that judgment.

On the 26th of September 1876, he con-

veyed all his right and interest in these letters patent to the other
defendant, Elisha C. Ager, who owned an equitable interest of onethird therein, and who, on the 8th of October 1877, reconveyed
the patent rights to Wilson by an assignment which was not recorded in the Patent Office. Wilson Ager resides in the District
of Columbia, and the other defendant resides in the state of California, and both appeared in the cause and answered to the merits
of the bill.
The bill prayed for an injunction against further assignment
pending the suit, and that the patents be sold under the direction
of the court, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of
the judgment debt; and that the defendant, Wilson Ager be required
to xecute such assignment as may be necessary to vest title in the
purchaser or purchasers, in conformity with the patent laws; and
for further relief. The court entered a decree that in default of
Wilson Ager paying by a certain day the judgment mentioned in
the bil, with interest and costs, and the costs of this suit, the
patent rights be sold and an assignment thereof executed by
him as prayed for, and that, in default of his executing such
assignment, some suitable person be appointed trustee to exec'te the same. From that decree the defendants appealed to this
court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, J.--The single question argued before us is whether a
patent right may be ordered by a court of equity to be sold and
the proceeds applied to the payment of a judgment debt of the
patentee.
A patent or a copyright, which vests the sole and exclusive
right of making, using and vending the invention, or of publishing and selling the book, in the person to whom it has been granted
by the government, as against all persons not deriving title through
him, is property, cepable of being assigned by him at his. pleasure;
although his assignment, unless recorded in the proper office, is
void against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees for a valuable
consideration without notice: Rev. Stat., sects. 4884, 4898, 4952,
4955. And the provisions of the patent and copyright acts, securing a sole and exclusive right to the patentee, do not exonerate
the right and property thereby acquired by him, of which he Te-
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ceives the profits, and has the absolute title and power of disposal,
from liability to be subjected by suitable judicial proceedings to
the payment of his debts.
In England it has long been held that a patent right would pass
by an assignment in bankruptcy, even without express words to
that effect in the Bankrupt Act : Hfesse v. Stevenson, 3 Bos. & Pul.
565; s. c. Davies Pat. Gas. 263 ; Longman v. Tripp, 2 New Rep.
67; Bloxarn v. Elsee, 1 Car. & P. 558; s. c. Ry. & Mood. 187;
6 B. & 0. 169 ; 9 D. & R. 215; i lawnan v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385;
.Edelsten v. Trick, 11 Hare 78 ; Hudson v. Osborne, 39 Law Jour.
(N. S.) Ch. 79. In Hlesse v. Stevenson, Mr. Justice CHAMBRE;
in the course of the argument, said: "The right to the patent is
made assignable; why then may it not be assigned under a commission of bankrupt?" 3 Bos. & Pul. 571. And Lord ALVANLEY,
delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, after observing
that it was contended "that the nature of the property in this
patent was such that it did not pass under the assignment," and
"that -although by the assignment every right and interest and
every right of action, as well as right of possession and possibility
of interest, is taken out of the bankrupt and vested in the assignee,
yet that the fruits of a man's own invention do not pass," said:
"It is true that the schemes which a man may have in his own
head before he obtains his certificate, or the fruits which he may
make of such schemes, do not pass, nor could the assignee require
him to assign them over, provided he does not carry his schemes
into effect until after he has obtained his certificate. But if he avail
himself of his knowledge and skill, and thereby acquire a beneficial interest, which may be the subject of Assigiment, I cannot
frame to myself an argument why that interest should not pass in
the same manner as any other property acquired by his personal
industry :" 3 Bos. & Pul..577, 578. The recent Bankrupt Act
of the United States, in defining what property should vest in the
assignee in bankruptcy, expressly enumerated " all rights in equity,
choses in, action, patent rights and copyrights," and required the
assignee to sell all the property of the bankrupt for the benefit of
his creditors: Rev. Stat., sects. 5046, 5062, 5064. The only
difference is, that in England all such rights pass that become
vested in the bankrupt before he'obtains a certificate of discharge,
whereas here only those rights pass which belong to him at the
I
ime of the assignment.
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It has been said by an English text-writer that " a patent right
may be seized and sold in execution by the sheriff under a fieri
facias, being in the nature of.a personal chattel :" Webster on
Patents 23. We are not aware of any instance in which such a
course has been judicially approved. But it is within the general
jurisdiction of a Court of Chancery to assist a judgment-creditor
to reach and apply to the payment of his debt any property of the
judgment-debtor, which by reason of its nature only, and not by
reason of any positive rule exempting it from liability for debt,
cannot be taken on execution at law; as in the case of trust property in which the judgment-debtor has the entire beneficial interest;
of shares in a corporation, or of choses in action : XicDerrnutt v.
Strong, 4 Johns. Ch. 687; Spader v. HYadden, 5 Id. 280, and 20
Johns. 554; BEdmeston v. Eyde, 1 Paige 637 ; Viggin v. Ze/wood, 118 Mass. 514; Sparhawk v. O/oon, 125 Id. 263; Daniels
v. Eldredge, 125 Id. 356 ; Drake v. Bice, 130 Id. 410.
In Stephens v. Oad 1, 14 How. 528, and again in Stevens v.
Gladding, 17 How. 447, the point decided was that by a sale of
the copperplate engraving of a map on execution from a state court
against the owner of the copyright, the purchaser acquired no
right to strike off and sell copies of the map.
Mr. Justice NELSSON, in delivering j'udgment in Stevens v. Cady,
said: "The copperplate engraving, like any other tangible personal
property, is the subject of seizure and sale on execution, and the
title passes to the purchase.', the same as if made at a private sale.
But the incorporeal right, secured by the statute to the author, to
multiply copies of the map by the use of the plate, being intangible
and resting altogether in grant, is not the subject of seizure or
sale by means of this process-certainly not at common law. No
doubt the property may be reached by a creditor's bill and be applied to the payment of the debts of the author, the same as stock
of the debtor is reached and applied, the court compelling a transfer and sale of the stock for the benefit of creditors." He then
cited the cases in Johnson's and IPaige's Reports, above referred
to, and added: "But in case of such remedy, we suppose it would
be necessary for the court to compel a transfer to the purchaser,
in conformity with the requirements of the copyright act, in order
to vest him with a complete title to the property :" 14 How.
531.
In Btevens v. Gladding, Mr. Justice CURTIS said: ' There
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would certainly be great difficulty in assenting to the proposition
that patent and copyrights held under the laws of the United
States, are subject to seizure and sale on execution. Not to repeat
what is said on this 'subject in 14 How. 531, it may be added that
these incorporeal rights do not exist in any particular state or district; they are co-extensive with the United States. There is
nothing in any Act of Congress, or in the nature of the rights
themselves, to give them localiy anywhere, so as to subject them
to, the process of courts having jurisdiction limited by the lines of
states and districts. That an execution out of the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Bristol, in the state of Massachusetts,
can be levied on an incorporeal right subsisting in Rhode Island
or New York, will hardly be pretended. That by the levy of such
an execution the entire right could be divided, and so much of it
as might be exercised within the county of Bristol sold, would be
a position subject to much difficulty. These are important questions,
on which we do not find it necessary to express an opinion, because
in this case neither the copyright, as such, nor any part of it, was
attempted to be sold:" 17 How. 451. The difficulties of which
the learned justice here speaks are of seizing and selling a patent
or copyright upon an execution at law, which is ordinarily levied
only upon property, or the rents and profits of property, that has
itself a visible and tangible existence within the jurisdiction of the
courftand the precinct of the officer; and do not attend decrees of
a court of equity, which are in personam, and may be enforced in
all cases where the person is within its jurisdiction: Mlassie v.
Watts, 6 Cranch 148. And the terms in which he refers to the
statement of Mr. Justice NELSON show that there was no intention
to criticise or qualify that statement.
There are, indeed, decisions in the Circuit Courts that an
assignee in insolvency, or a receiver, of all the property of a
debtor, appointed under the laws of a state, does not, by virtue of
the general assignment or appointment merely, without any conveyance made by the debtor or specifically ordered by the court,
acquire a title in patent rights: Ashcroft v. Walworth, 1 Holmes
C. C. 152; Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Blatchf. C. C. 234. But in
Ashcroft v. TIWaluworth, Judge SIPEPLEY clearly intimated that the
courts of the state might have compelled the debtor to excute such
a conveyance. And the highest courts of New York and California have affirmed the power, upon a creditor's bill, to order the
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assignment and sale of a patent right for the payment of the
patentee's judgment; debts: Gillette v. Bate, 86 N. Y. ; Pacific
Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal.
In Carver v. Peck, 131 Mass. 291, the court' reserved the expression of any opinion upon that uestion, because unnecessary to the
decision. And the assumption in Cooper v. Gunn, 4 B. Monroe
594, that an author could not be deprived, against his will, and in
favor of any of his creditors, of any of the rights secured to him
by the copyright acts, was merely obiter dictum, unsupported by
reasoning or authority.
.
In the case at bar, the bill is filed by a judgment-creditor of
!he patentee in a court of the United States of appropriate jurisdiction, against the patentee, residing within the district and holding the entire legal title'and two-thirds of the equitable interest
in the patent right, and against the owner of an equitable interest
in the remaining third, who is properly-made a party to the bill.
Both defendants are before the court and have filed answers.
The debtor's interest in the patent rights is property, assignable
by him, and which cannot be taken on execution at law. The
case is thus brought directly within the opinion delivered by Mr.
Justice NrLSON in Stephens v. Cady, of the soundness of which
we entertain no doubt.
The clause of the decree below, appointing a trustee to execute
an assignment if the patentee should not himself execute one as
directed by the decree, has not been objected to in argument, and
was clearly within the chancery powers of the court as defined in
the statute of Maryland of 1785, which is in force in the District
of' Columbia: Maryland Stat. 1785, c. 72, sects. 7, 13, 25; -2
Kilty's Laws; Laws of District of Columbia (ed. 1868) pages 326,
328, 833, 836."
Decree affirmed.

WHIPPLE v. WHITMAN.

Supreme Court of Bhode Island.
WHIPPLE v. WHITMAN.
The American law, unlike the English, does not empower an attorney-at-law to
settle a pending suit without the knowledge and assent of his client.
Courts in this country, however, are inclined to favor a compromise fairly made
by an attorney, and will uphold it if good reasons can be found for it.
Hence the court refused to disturb a compromise made by an attorney, with the
assent of the party in interest, but without tile knowledge of the plaintiff of record .
the attorney's client; the compromise appearing reasonable and advantageous.
A. sued, as trustee of his wife, who, under the Rhode Island statutes, could at
any time by her sole act assign the claim sued. A.'s attorney, without his knowledge, but with the wife's assent, compromised the suit. A. waited nearly a 5dar
and then filed his petition for a trial of the cause; the wife claiming to have been,
coerced into giving her assent, but the coercion rose only from a mortgage executed
by A. and his wife: Held, that the petition must be dismissed.

PLAINTIFF'S petition for a trial.
Toltn Hl. Brennan, Ziba 0. Slocum and James C. Collins, for
plaintiff.
Henry B. Whitman, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURFEE, 0. J.-This is a petition for the trial of an action,
brought in this court by the petitioner as trustee of his wife, in
which judgment was rendered for the defendant on submission for
ten cents costs. The petitioner alleges in the petition that his attorneys submitted to judgment without his knowledge and consent,
and against his wishes and interest. He makes affidavit in support
of the petition. The petitioner was in fact in jail under sentence
for four months when the judgment was rendered, and it is not
claimed that he personally either knew of or consented to it.
The action was for money lent. The money originally came
from policies of insurance payable to the father of the petitioner's
wife and assigned by him to her. According to the father's'testimony the plaintiff had no ground for expecting to recover more
than about $3100, though, being inclined to exaggerate, he did'in
fact claim a much larger sum. The defendant on the other hand
maintained and now testifies that he had paid all but $1900, and
that he-had claims in set-off or counter claims in excess of that
amount. One Samuel G. Curry also had a claim against the peti-
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tioner and his wife for -about $1800, money lent on interest at five
per cent. a month, for which he was secured by mortgage on the
suit and on Mrs. Whipple's furniture. The judgment was the
result of a settlement by which $150 were paid to Mrs. Whipple;
$1200 to Samuel G. Curry in extinguishment of his claim, and
$300 to the attorneys to compensate them for their services. 'Mrs.
Whipple also secured permission to occupy free of rent for'a certain time her house, which was under mortgage to the defendant.
The settlement was made with the consent and approval of Mrs.
Whipple, acting under the advice of two trustworthy friends, men
of business, whom she had called in at the suggestion of the attorneys. She, however, asserts that she consented under pressure.
The inducement which principally led to the settlement, aside from
the advantages of money in hand over money in suit, were, first
the danger of delay which, owing to the ruinous rates of interest
.p'omised to Curry, was likely to prove as disastrous as defeat, and
second to the possibility that an administrator might be appointed
on the estate of Mrs. Whipple's father, at the instigation of the
defendant unless he was appeased, and might contest her right t9
the money in suit on the ground that her father who was insolvent
when he assigned to her, executed the assignment in fraud of his
creditors. We are satisfied that the settlement was fair and probably advantageous, and that if the attorneys had power to compromise they are not chargeable with any abuse of their power.
Judgment was rendered for the defendant in the -action in
April 1880.
This petition was not filed until April 9th
1881. One of the'results of the settlement was that the mortgage
which Curry held on Mrs. Whipple's furniture was transferred for
her benefit to her mother. This 'mortgage was subsequently surrendered, and a new mortgage given on the furniture, thus released,
by the petitioner and his wife, to raise money for him. Under the
new mortgage the furniture has been sold to satisfy the debt secured by it. The question is whether in view of all the circumstances, the settlement shall be upheld or a trial granted.
The decisions on the power of an attorney to compromise are
contradictory. In England, however, the doctrine established by
the later cases, after some vacillation, is, that the attorney has
power by virtue of his retainer, to compromise the actibn in which
he is retained, provided he acts bonafide and reasonably and does
not violate the positive instructions of his client, and that the corn-
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promise will bind the client, even if he does violate instructions,
unless the violation is known to the adverse party: Swinfen v.
Swinfen, 18 C. B. 485; Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford, 5 H. & N.
890; Chambers v. Mason, 5 0. B. N. S. 59; Chown v. Parrott,
14 Id. 74; Prestwich v. Poley, 18 Id. 806; Fray v. Voules, 1
El. & El. 839; Butler v. Knight, L. R., 2 Exoh. 109; Thomas v.
Harris,27 L. J. N. S. Exch. 353; In re Wood, Ex parte Wenham, 21 W. R. 104. The reason is, the attorney, within the scope
of his retainer, is considered the general agent of the client.
And it is strongly argued in support of the power, that it ought to
be upheld both as a matter of public policy and for the good of the
client, inasmuch as the attorney generally knows vastly better than
the client whether it is better to risk the trial of the suit or to
compromise it, and is often called upon to do the one or the other
suddenly in the absence of the client. See Wharton on Agency,
§ 590.
The English doctrine finds support in a few American cases:
Wieland v. White, 109 Mass. 392; Potter v. Parsons, 14 Iowa
286; Holmes v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 191;. North Missouri Railroad
Co. v. Stephens, 36 Mo. 150 ; Reinholdt v. Alberti. 1 Binn. 469;
but the main current of decision in this country seems powerfully
against it: Weeks on Attorneys-at-Law, § 228; Ambrose v. Me-Donald,53 Cal. 28; Preston v. Bill, 50 Id. 43; Levy, Simon .4,
Co. v. Brown, 56 Miss. 83; Pickett v. Merchants' .Nat. Bank of
Memphis, 32 Ark. 346; Walden v. Bolton, 55 Mo. 405; lfandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N. Y. 528; Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415;
The People v. Quick, 92 Id. 580. The American courts, however,
show a leaning in favor of such compromises, when fairly made,
and readily uphold them if they can find grounds on which to do
so, "although," says Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch 436, 452, "an attorney-at-law, merely as such, has
strictly speaking no right to make a compromise, yet a court would
be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself
as to be exclaimed against by all and to create an impression that
the judgment of the attorney has been imposed on or not fairly
exercised." See also Roller v. Wooldridge, 46 Tex. 485; Potter
v. Parsons, 14 Iowa 286.
In the case at bar there are several reasons why the court should
not disturb the compromise. The compromise was in itself fair
and reasonable if not eminently advantageous. We mention this
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rather as a favorable feature than as an absolute reason for upholding the compromise, since a party who prefers litigation to settlement is generally entitled to enjoy his preference: Frayv. Youles,
1 El. & El. 839. The case here, however, was peculiar in its circumstances. The plaintiff was suing, not for himself, but as trustee
for his wife. She was the real owner, so to speak, of the lawsuit.
Under our tatute (Gen. Stat. R. I. cap. 152, § 6), she might, for
aught we can see, have assigned for valuable consideration, her
equitable or beneficial interest in the suit or in the debt sued for,
absolutely and without joinder with her husband, 'to some third
person or even to the defendant himself. But if she had the right
to do this, we do not see why she had not also the right, in the
absence of her husband, acting under the advice of trustworthy
friends, to enter into a fair and reasonable compromise of the suit.
To hold that the husband might arbitrarily reject a compromise,
which she desired, would be to put her completely at his mercy. It
seems to us that the most which he could require, considering hig
purely titular relation to the suit, would be indemnity for his costs
and expenses as trustee, which in the case here he seems to have substantially got in the settlement. It is true the wife claims to have
acted under pressure, but the pressure, so far as appears, came
from Samuel G. Curry, whom she and her husband by their contracts and mortgages had armed with highly oppressive powers.
We do not think it. vas such as to invalidate the compromise.
Moreover, even if this view were inadmissible, it was the duty of
the petitioner, if he chose not to abide by the compromise, to repudiate it promptly and'offer to do what he could to reinstate the parties in stata quo: Mlayer v. Foulcrod, 4 Wash. C. 0. 511; Peru
Steel and Iron Co. v. Whipple File and Steel lJfanuf. Co., 109
Mass. 464. He did not do so, but waited nearly a year before
bringing this petition, enjoying meanwhile the benefit of the settlement. He does not even now offer restitution, but on the contrary
he has taken advantage of the surrender of the mortgage on his
wife's furniture to mortgage it anew, thus ratifying the settlement
to that extent, aud, as he cannbt ratify in part witfout ratifying in
toto, virtually ratifying it in its entirety.
We think, therefore, that a trial must be denied, but under the
circumstances With6ut costs.
]Vetition dismissed.

